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Historian Lewis Sorley is a third generation graduate of West Point with a doctorate from 
Johns Hopkins. His two decades of military service included teaching posts at the Army 
War College and West Point. In A Better War he provides us with a clearly-written and 
well-documented study of the last years of the US presence in South Viet Nam under the 
leadership of General Creighton Abrams, who succeeded William Westmoreland as US 
commander in 1968. (Sorley has already served Abrams well in his much-admired 1992 
biography Thunderbolt.) Some of the most important events and processes of the entire 
war took place under Abrams' post-Tet command. By then, however, US media concern 
with Viet Nam had declined and become even more ritualized. Thus, most of the limited 
attention Americans give that conflict focuses on the period from the Johnson escalation 
to Tet (1965-68). Thereafter, the story quickly descends to how American extricated itself 
from the "unwinnable" war. Drawing on much material only recently available, Sorley 
offers a powerful corrective to this distorted and deceptive image. He calls our attention 
to truths that are unfashionable, little-known or quite forgotten. And he effectively 
reveals Creighton Abrams as one of the nation's finest officers, a commander who truly 
deserved "a better war."  
Besides Abrams, the heroes of the account are Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Saigon 
CIA chief William Colby. This impressive triumvirate all shared a "one-war" approach to 
the struggle. With their support Abrams made security for the civilian population a top 
priority, replaced massive sweep operations with clear-and-hold tactics, dumped the 
corrupting body counts, improved the equipment and training of the South Vietnamese 
army (ARVN), and decreased the destructiveness of US firepower in civilian areas. Thus, 
Sorley gives us a well-drawn picture of what the war should have and could have been 
like years earlier. But these sensible and efficacious reforms were occurring in the midst 
of the unilateral US drawdown of forces. Abrams' army was melting away under his feet.  
Abrams understood that, although the South Vietnamese could not have defeated Hanoi's 
1972 Easter Offensive without US air support, this support would have availed little if 
ARVN had not stood firm. Sorley shows that by 1973 the south was well able to stand 
against the communists, provided it could count on continued help from the US (as the 
South Koreans and Israelis do, for example). In fact Sorley, like Abrams, is convinced 
that the allies had won the war as far back as the Cambodian Incursion of 1970. The VC 
were finished. Then in the 1972 Easter Offensive the PAVN took its best shot -- and 
failed.  
There are also villains in the book: Westmoreland of course, but also Clark Clifford and 
Averell Harriman. Sorley is so right about Harriman, a major conspirator of the Diem 
debacle and the real father of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. One is tempted to say that all 
Sorely's evaluations of the better-known figures are just; he even provides an insightful 
estimate of President Thieu. There is perhaps one exception: with all his undoubted 
faults, William Westmoreland did labor under unprecedented and ultimately disastrous 
constraints emanating from the White House basement. But the general's perplexities 
evoke scant sympathy from Sorley.  
In his summation, Sorley explains why, if South Viet Nam was in such good shape by 
1972 with the failure of both the VC and the PAVN, it still went down to ignominious 
defeat. Of the many causes of this lamentable and preventable denouement, Sorley 
emphasizes limited competence in the highest levels of the Southern army and the failure 
to close the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But above all it was the moral and physical effects of 
being openly abandoned by their US allies that sank the South Vietnamese, undoing all of 
Abrams' intelligent and fruitful efforts.  
This excellent book might do a great deal of good. So few Americans even (or especially) 
today grasp the big lesson of the Viet Nam War: however expansively and destructively, 
the Americans and their allies totally defeated the vaunted Communist People's War 
strategy. Yet the effects of Sorley's book may be limited because, as he perceptively and 
disturbingly reminds us, it was necessary that the South Vietnamese lose in order to 
preserve the self-esteem of a huge flock of honking pundits, academics and politicians. In 
any case, A Better War deserves a very wide audience, and certainly belongs in every 
collection, however modest in size, of works not only about Viet Nam but also about the 
neo-Clausewitzian trinity of warfare, politics and leadership.  
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